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Jeffrey K. /lass

The Experience of War
and the Construction of Normality.
Lessons from the Blockade
of Leningrad·
War and Social Meaning:
Interpretations and Political Normality
On June 22, I94 I, the Nazi war machine crossed the border into
the Soviet Union, initiating a process that would shape post -war
Soviet politics and society in fundamental ways. This is no small
claim: the twin revolutions of 1917 and I 929 - the first «from
below» and the second «from above» -- were (and remain) awesome
moments of social change and transformation . However, Wester!l
historiography remains trapped within the shadows of these first two
events , to the detriment of the third . This is odd, considering how
important experiences of war are in Western polities. Events of war
and their interpretations (at that moment and subsequently) shape
symbols and discourse of political normality. World War I created
throughout Western Europe a cynicism to politics of modernity and
the nation, while World War II paradoxically rebuilt national identity
and feeling. In Britain, the experience of total war twice shaped
national consciousness, enhancing distrust of the Continent (source of
both wars) and a feeling of unique heroism against tremendous odds.
The myth of Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain reverberate today ; the
late Queen Mother was revered because she and George VI, remained
in London during the Blitz and went out in public to inspect damage,
an image of a monarch sharing his subjects' tribulations and creating
a bond. The impact of war, especially World War I I, on Soviet and
--··· ·--· - ·- - - ·· -- --··- ·-- ·-- - ·--

* Thanks to the following-fo~ -invaluable help: the Nuffield Foundation (Lnited
Kingdom) and the University of Richmond (faculty research committee) for
financial suppon: l'iikita Lomagin for many ideas and advice about the Blockade and
data: and Miguel Centeno, Stephen Kotkin , Jorge Rodriguez, and Robena Franzosi for
helping me think about culture, power. and war. Address any correspondence to Jeff
I lass. jhass@richmond edu or jeffhass89@post. harvard.edu. In memory of Mitchell
Kennet h Has~ (August I 5, 2000 - February 11, 2002).

240

Russian identities, conceptions or political and social normality and
legitimacy, and social practices is both well-known and unknown :
well-known in that Russians and Western scholars of the region
understand the impo11ancc or the war for Soviet society and afterward;
unknown in that Western scholarship has paid little theoretical or
empirical attention to this subject. Despite this impot1ancc of World
War II to Soviet politics and society, and its potential contributions to
understandings of politics and power generally, Western studies of the
Soviet experience pays scant or only passing attention to the impo11ancc
of World War I I in shaping Soviet politics. 1
In this essay I use the example of the Blockade of Leningrad an ext reme example of the Soviet experience of World War 11 , and
an extreme example of the experience of war generally - to addn;ss
two issues. The first is a more general, theoretical issue: the importance
of war to the construction of political and social normality and
practices. Political science and sociology have examined the impact
of war on structures and institutions, such as states or gender roles
and relations; but the impact of war on meanings and meaning
systems is addressed only empirically, often without much theoretical
reflection . The second issue is how World War II shaped the specific
meaning systems, cosmologies, and assumptions about normal practice
among Soviet citizens ·- put another \Vay , how the war impacted on
Soviet hahitus. Given its radical , extreme nature , the Blockade experience
should go far to illuminating these issues -- and a study of the
Blockade can also liberate those voices and experiences kept in the
quiet for too long, ironically in the name of' Soviet authority and the
stable rule of the Communist Party.

War and Soviet Society
The usual account of the emergence of Soviet institutions, belief<:;,
and practices stresses the Revolution and the 1930s. The post 1945 Soviet social order is fundamentally that of the 1930s; narratives
do not place much, if any, emphasis on the impact or World War II.
Even so-called «revisionists» of Soviet history do not go beyond 1939
to explain the rise of Soviet civilization: Soviet politics ends in 1938,
and the rest is a footnote. 2 Sheila Fitzpatrick and students have
Produced fine scholarship on workers, peasants, and the state, and on
relations of power, culture, and resistance in the I 930s.1 Stephen
Kotkin 's Magnetic Mountain examines Stalinism as civilization, without
asking whether that civilization's development was fundamentall y
shaped by the experience of the war that followed - not simply that
the war might have legitimated sacrifices and see mingly bizarre
Policies of the 1930s, but that the war might have changed the very
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ways that the Soviet people thought or their system anJ elite, and
how that elite and its operatives (e.g. in the Party of NKVD- KGB)
might have , in turn, though about a society that !'cit it deserved more
freedom, peace, and plenty following even great.er sacrifices and
victory by 1945. 1
Studies or Soviet identity as well focus exclusively on the 1930s
without considering the impact or the war --·· war, which in the West
played a crucial role in the formation of national consciousness. (If
Stalin and his people built socialism in the 1930s, his people
defended it afterwards.) Jochen Hellbeck 's discuss io n of the creation
of the new Soviet subject (using intimate diary materials) is titled
Revolution on my Mind, as if the creation of that subject is primarily
an outcome of the l 930s.5 One good illustration of this oversight in
scholarship is a chapter by Ronald Grigor Suny in an edited book
on the USSR and Nazi Germany .6 In a 27 -pagc overview of the rise
and consolidation of Stalin 's authority and system , Suny assigns two
pages to World War 1I, conflating the complex history of war and
aftermath (Stalin's early breakdown, confusion over strategies,
Leningrad's symbolic challenge and the «Zhdanov affair»). Suny also
assumes the war played to Stalin's game of personal power and
Soviet legitimacy: «Official propaganda convincingly identified the
victory over Nazism with the superiority of the Soviet system, its
organic link with rodina (the motherland) , and the perso nal genius of
Stalin. »7 It did? Was propaganda so convincing, or did people have
their own worldviews about victory and status? What aspects of «the
system» were organically linked to the «motherland »?
This is particularly odd considering the importance Soviet scholars
(as well as state and people) gave to the war and that some archiv~I
materials from the war period arc open. 8 Perhaps more important 15
that historical and comparative sociological has successfully pointe_d
out the significance of war to politics and social structure. This
should have alerted scholars to the likelihood that World War II
would have a significant impact on Soviet society and politi~s.
Certainly this was understood in private discussions and university
lectures; yet in the discourse of Western scholarship, the story of the
war was confined primarily to accounts of military history or
Stalin ' s Jeadershi p. I do not want to make the error of replacing one
all-determining historical moment ( 1917, the 1930s) with another
(World War I I) . I take as given that pre-1941 historical events were
an important foundation for Soviet institutions, identities, and practices.
However, these historical trajectories were reshaped by war; no better
proof exists than the fact that by the 1960s more work was published
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on the war than on the Revolution, and Brezhnev resurrected the
war experience to create a «cult of war. »9 The experience and victory
of war - surviving the horrifying Nazi onslaught at Leningrad ,
Sevastopol, and Stalingrad and emerging victorious - legitimated the
Soviet project. Socialism was not merely the absence of exploitation,
it was the expression of a superior modernity in a real confrontation
with the capitalist West. 10 Scholarship on war elsewhere shows that
if other foundational myths persist, the experience of war changes
them or subordinates them, and adds to the social pantheon. 11 To
make sense of the construction of political culture and dynamics of
political legitimation and normalization, we cannot avoid war. It is
time to reincorporate it into the study of Soviet history. 12

War and Socio-Political Meaning
Social science has shown the centrality of war to modernity: no
war, no nationalism, no modern state, no modern welfare , retarded
development of women 's right- the list could go on. 13 These accounts
tend lo privilege either structures and institutions or socialpsychological dynamics. In political science the obvious body of work
is international relations. In political sociology, scholars have looked
more at war lo make sense of modern political structure and
institutions. Theda Skocpol demonstrated the centrality of war to
revolutions and American welfare . 1-1 Just as the British welfare system
was born after World War II , to reward the «land of heroes,»
American welfare began as a reward (or political bribe) to heroes
who fought in the Civil War. Charles Tilly also changed our
understanding of the emergence of states and variation in state
structures by relating state-making to war- making. 15 In these studies,
however,meaning remains problematic - it is missing,epiphenomenal,
or related primarily to propaganda or elites. While not wanting to
turn entirely to a pluralist model of politics, 16 I suggest this oversight
requires correction . Meaning among non-elites is as important as
meaning among elites, for this relates to the elites' «formula of rule, »
the claims and rhetoric which legitimate elite power and turn it into
accepted authority. 17 Distance between official propaganda and policies,
and popular meanings and convictions, can impact politics in several
Ways. Alternative meanings can survive underground and act as a
Springboard for resistance, or at least dampen support when challenge
emerges. 18 Thus, a central issue becomes how people interpret and give
meaning to their experiences of war. If political culture is important, 19
the context that generates political culture is central to helping us
Understand where national meanings and traditions emerge. Because
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of its power and impact through such traumas as sacrifice and loss,
war is one such context. 20
This essay begins to broach these issues by examining what kinds
of meanings emerge «from below» in the experience of war -- not
only meanings per se, but also their structure into dichotomies of
sacred and profane. The relation the «formula of rule » and average
people 's frames depends in part on how people construct dichotomies
of social and political sacred and profane. The experience of war
shapes such dichotomi.es - in the case of the Blockade, dichotomies
often present in Soviet logic and propaganda. However, these sacredprofane dichotomies led to potential and often powerful contradictions
between idealized sacred norms and values - ideals made more ideal
by the Blockade experience - versus everyday practices of survival
that often slid into the profane. This will be clearer in the moral
economy of food, where the socialist system of state-run provision was
supposed to insure survival and fairness, but where Leningradcrs had to
tum to less ideal means to obtain enough food to survive. As well , we
will sec a moral economy of bodies and death - the ideal of a peaceful
order under Soviet socialism, versus the realities of corpses littering
the streets or cannibalism. Certainly this will not exhaust all themes
from experiences and diaries, although a few powerful themes reappear:
cold, hunger, bombing and shelling, exerting one's will to stay active
and alive, and cooperation versus exclusion. 21 Such issues became
central to making sense of the Blockade, the war, and social normality.
As an example of war's most horrendous impact on civilians, the
Blockade of Leningrad provides a powerful source of data on this very
process. In general, however, the Soviet experience of World War II
is a powerful laboratory for studying the process of creating, imposing,
consuming, and resisting political meanings and hegemony: not only
was this a major (if not the major) point in Soviet history; the Soviet
regime and its state officials were also very conscious of the importance
of political culture, as noted. Put simply, the Blockade provides a
radical case of the experience of war (not only of the Soviet
experience, although this is part of our investigation as well):
bombing and shelling; suffering and deprivation (lack of heat and
water during cold winters, horrendously inadequate food supply);
constant threat from a powerful, aggressive enemy; constant propagand;:i
from home and aggressor states; constant interaction with one s
state and regime during wartime; location directly at the front line
but not occupicd. 22 With the effects of war and the struggle for
survival at their most intense and desperate, we can see the effects ?f
war on individuals and institutions at their starkest. Much as Kotktn
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used Magnitogorsk as a focused case study to examine the building of
Soviet socialism, I use the Blockade as a focused case study on war·s
effects in general, and in particular on state -society relations and
constructions of meaning and legitimacy. 23

Ascertaining Interpretations «From Below»: Diaries
Wartime diaries provide one source of data on the interaction
between the experience of war and the formation of social and
political meanings . While a few diaries were obviously a continuation
of pre-war diaries, which the Party often encouraged among its
activists and members as a way of inculcating the new Soviet
identity, 24 many diaries began on or soon after the outbreak of the
war - showing the significance of the war and Blockade to
Leningraders ' own identiti es and senses of overall mcaning. 25 Such
mea nings (and culture in general) are contextual, and comprehending
the dyna mics governing the formation of meaning required accounting
for that context. War time diaries, correspondence (e.g. letters), and
other forms of communication and discourse shed some light on
those dynamics. 26 Wartime diaries also help avoid the danger of
circularity: we see what people were thinking during the war, not what
they read into it afterwards. Post-war reflections are important but
do not show war's impact at the moment of war.
This is not a study of «public opinion » per se, for reasons of
sampling. It is far from clear that Leningradcrs who left extensive
diaries (or diaries at all), for posterity or especially for archives, are
adequately representative . Certainly in archives one finds diaries
written by blue-collar workers (usually skilled), white -collar personnel,
managers, Party and state officials, cultural workers (including members
of the intelligentsia); by men and women; by older, middle-aged, and
Young (teen-aged) inhabitants; by those born in Leningrad and
those who moved to it. The number of diaries left behind is small in
comparison to the city's population, and it is difficult to control for
individual peculiarities (e.g. of individual personal history and habitus)
that would color issues and interpretations. Further, writing a diary is
an exercise in discipline - making entries on a regular basis,
including sufficient detail and commentary so that the diary provides
sufficient content for analysis. Even disciplined people may be loo
busy with work, life, or survival. However, a study of diaries can be
helpful at an early stage in this kind of study. Extrapolating from
existing diaries can provide hypotheses fur further testing or
refinement. As well, even such a limited data set can provide insights
into what people actually thought, what they felt was important to
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take time to write down, and how they came to those issues and
meanings (which we could infer from contexts in which issues and
comments arose). This is people 's own meanings, not what closedendcd surveys tease out. In a system where formal discourse was
controlled through censorship, threats of arrest, and Party control of
information, diaries are a site and vehicle of personal, underground
discourse - not discourse between people but for the self. To tease
out that personal, underground discourse, I try to use diary material
from as many different social strata and contexts as possible, to
provide important insights and help us possible discover sets of
meanings and patterns of wartime meaning formation that alter can
be tested in different places and times. Naturally we must be aware
not only of what diarists mentioned but also what they did not, 27 for
sometimes people felt the need for caution, given constant reminders
on wall placards about the need to avoid contributing to rumors that
might help the enemy. 28
The war, and especially the Blockade , weakened Party's ability to
conduct propaganda. Internal documents within the division for
agitation and propaganda note the immense difficulties carrying out
«agitprop» work. Party aktiv were mobilized for other activities ,
such as helping the evacuation, mobilizing production, and even
going to fight (or getting out of the city) ; agitprop cadres could
also fall victim to death from hunger or cold. 29 As a result, there
were fewer agitprop cadres left to give lectures, hold discussions
and «office hours,» visit factories and homes, and continue putting
up newspapers on street walls. 30 Thus, there was likely some degree
of individual autonomy in keeping diaries. While Hellbeck rejects
the public-private dichotomy as an artifact of liberal societies, 31 this
weakens our appreciation for games of power and resistance. As
Erving Goffman noted , people experience multiple front stages and
back stages, and they play to these different audiences. 32 Following
this insight and his own research, James C. Scott noted that people
have great creative capacity for playing different transcripts in
different contexts; the private becomes where people feel relatively
safer from the gaze and exercise of power. 33 Despite the Stalinist
regime and totalitarian repression, the war was a moment of
liberation. The reality of war and survival, coupled with the Partystate's preoccupation with the war, provides a glimpse into some
autonomous making of meaning-not only during war, but also in
the midst of Soviet socialism's grand project of remaking humans
into homo sovieticus.
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Themes, Tropes, and Interpretations:
Making Meaning of the Blockade
I carry out this analysis in the double spirit of verstehen and
induction. Max Weber saw verstehen as the heart of social scicnce to understand how people think and, in doing so, reproduce social
structures and institutions. This survives in the tradition of the
sociology of knowledge and ethnographic methods. I approach
verstehen by going directly to people 's own representations as well as
actions - looking at what was done (to the best of our ability to
account for practices) and at how actions were interpre ted . This also
follows Hellbeck's analysis of Stalinism and personal identities: by
looking closely at how people discussed themselves and contexts in
diaries, Hellbeck followed the construction or the subject amidst
Stalinist institutions and power relations. 34 Further, given that theory
of state-society relations and political legitimacy/ normality remains
underdeveloped , there are few concrete propositions to test.
I use two tactics to provide some analytic structure . The first tactic
is to compare diarists from different social locations, or location
within a society's structural-institutional matrix. There are myriad
locations one could choose from. Because of the importance of
formal ideology to the Soviet system, 35 relation to the Party seems
important , at least at the outset of the analysis. As well, given the
Soviet Union's anti-capitalist ideology and institutional order, relations
to the state seem important as well. In the Soviet construction of
«class,» three classes were important: the working class, the peasantry,
and the intelligentsia. A fourth unofficial «class» was the bureaucracyunavoidablc, massive as the bureaucracy was in a modem but anticapitalist society (where the state takes the place of private property
and civil society) . Finding peasant diaries in the Blockade has proven
difficult, so I leave this group out. I have drawn my data from a
selection of diaries whose authors cover a range of social locations.
These include a model «new Soviet person» (a skilled worker and
Komsomolets); assistant managers at industrial enterprises; an older
industrial worker sympathetic to the Party and Soviet power; a
woman from the cultural intelligentsia who did cultural work during
the Blockade; a young woman trained as an engineer, starting her
working life as the Blockade struck; an assistant to the planning
department at the Seventh State Electric Station who also worked at
the Sevkabel factory ; a young boy (likely 11-12 years old) not yet
been subject to the full force of propaganda; and a teacher and artist.
While any «social location» (class, ethnicity, etc.) is a social construction,
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people took the identities and consequences of such locations
seriously. One related issue is sampling and representation. Diaries in
archives are not a random sample of the Leningrad population;
diarists in particular, by the very action of keeping a diary, arc
involved in a more active process of creating meaning. I keep this in
mind so as to be modest with claims.
My second tactic for structuring the narratives and analysis is to
follow particular themes that are important to making sense of the
war-legitimacy nexus and that appear to recur. There is a caveat here:
given the stress on induction and the spirit of hypothesis-generation
in this essay , the problems of selection bias, and the differences in
actual personalities of those who kept diaries, any comparison will be
less than perfect. The usual rule of comparisons is to be as rigorous
as possible in controlling for the variables under examination; we
will have to be a little lenient here, given the nature of the data. This
warning aside, I pay close attention to what people viewed as sacred
and profane. What was the everyday Blockade experience for these
people? What had real meaning, and how was that meaning colored
by war? This helps us construct an initial picture of a moral order:
suffering and death; the moral economy of provision, and survival in
general; and who the heroes and villains were. Suffering and death
are rampant in war, interrupting our sense of order, stability, and
fairness; this is related to theodicy, why suffering or tragedy strikes
those who seemingly do not deserve it. 36 To address suffering and
death, Leningrad inhabitants tried to remake sense of the normal
order of the social universe to explain or justify suffering. By «moral
economy» I follow E. P. Thompson's example: claims and meanings
(sacred and profane) assigned to economic experiences. Crucial here
is obtaining food, whether in the formal system of state-run stores
and rationing, or via the rynok (bazaar) . What did people say about
privileges and privations - did they comment on how they got food,
while commenting on or critiquing how others did so? Moral
economy is important because here the reality of survival ran headlong
into formal Bolshevik discourse and value systems: while people could
«speak Bolshevik» and articulate (and perhaps in the process even
accept) the regime's claims about morality and reality, no discourse by
itself generates food. How did individuals deal with the reality of
obtaining food in an anti-capitalist workers' paradise at war? 37
I propose the following structure of sacred-profane categories and
dichotomies. While not exhaustive, this encapsulates several hypotheses:
that interpretations of war and Blockade were structured in such a
way; that framing as sacred-profane provides explanatory power to
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us, investigators, and to blokadniki; and that dichotomies were
sufficiently significant that Party-state elites had to address them
during and after the war. ix

Profane

Sacred
Order

Chaos

Collectivist behavior, ko/lektiv

Jndividualism. self
Market/ patron age
economy of provision
Suffering
Favoritism and patronage
Filthiness

Moral economy of provision
Contentment
Justice and equality
Cleanliness
Reality (e.g. of rumors, experience)
Relations (e.g. to outside, to others)
Death

=

natural cause s; respected

Soviet/Russian nation . people;
Party as ideal

Propaganda and official news
Isolation (e.g. from rest
of USSR.others)
Death = result of cruelty;
hidden, disrespectful
Fascists (Party cadres
sometimes here)

The issue of sacred versus profane is important in this analysis
because it was a unifying logic throughout diarists ' narratives ·somcthing that would not surprise Emile Durkheim. 39 Commenting
on events and observations, diarists created dichotomies: profanity of
real behavior versus the sacredness of ideals; or of two different
observed behaviors that roughly corresponded to sacred (ideal)
versus profane. Durkheim noted the importance of sacred and
profane in the construction of religious cosmologies and, generally, in
the construction of social identity: the sacred as us and what the
collective ideally means, versus the profane of the outside «other»
that defines the self or group through opposition . If Kotkin is
correct and Bolshevism was a religion or church of sorts, where
capitalism was profane and the Soviet leadership defined Soviet
socialism as its sacred anti-capitalist antithesis, then we should see
sacred-profane dichotomies appear as part of the fundamental
structure of commentary, if not of the narratives of events themselves.

War as Drama
The first theme that structures narratives - a theme which appears
fairly consistently across diaries usually without diarists noting it - is
the sense of the Blockade, and the war generally, as drama. While drama
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itself is not sacred or profane, through it diarists drew out sacred and
profane logics: a noble drama of preparation , hope, volunteerism, and a
profanity of defeat and retreat , tragedy , sufTcring , and corruption . A<>
such, the logic of drama helps structure sacred-profane dichotomies
that follow , as authors «discovered » dichotomies as the drama unkllded.
Further, if the Soviet mission of constructing anti-capitalist modernity
in the 1930s was Manichean, the drama of war extended but also
altered it : sacred in pitting Soviet civilization against fascism (ironically
being
alongside capitalist democracies), profane in its very essence
war. The USSR played a leading role in the drama , defending the
civilized world against uncivilized fascist aggression. Diaries are littered
with references to uncivilized Germans, and popular views dovetailed
with propaganda of' Germans as «beasts» (zven") deserving hatred ,
contempt, and rcvenge. 40 Within Soviet civilization , some actors had
more prominent roles than others: Stalin and the Red Army, but also
inhabitants or Leningrad in their own versions of the drama. While
they neither fought at the front nor made military decisions, they did
hold out, maintained production , and sacrificed money, time , energy,
and life for the war effort and to defend Leningrad . As much as the
people, the city itself as entity is perhaps the prominent actor. Diarists
repeatedly make reference to Leningrad as a city of beauty, culture, and
history: the cradle or the revolution, home to prominent Russian
cultural creations, its combination or architecture and weather gave it
a sense of lite reflected in nineteenth-century writings (e.g. by Gogol ,
Dostoevskii, and others).
Plays and movies, according to the general rule of thumb, have
three acts: the first sets up the scenario and begins the tension, the
second develops the contracjictions underlying the dramatic tension ,
and the third revolves the contradictions. Diaries did not follow this
three-act structure perfectly, but there is a sense of an underlying
drama at work. These acts followed the logic of sacred-profane and its
contradictions of ideals versus reality and practice. Act one involved
the sudden intrusion of war into the peaceful ideal of Soviet socialist
life (even if the reality or the Terror, the Winter War against Finland ,
and the constant international threats belied this). How could war,
and the rapid German advance, happen amidst the peace-loving
Soviet population that in the 1930s tried to build the more perfect
future (including one without capitalist wars)? Act two involved the
tension of survival and both the breakdown and solidification of
norms as practices. The tension itself was the very act of confrontingbut not always resolving - contradictions of ideals versus real
survival. «Socialism» was not enough. Act three was the resolution of

or
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tension through «banalization » of war - the implicit acceptance of
the Blockade as a reality and an attempt to rebuild ideal norms as
practices - and eventual victory.
Act one was the beginning of the war - fairly dramatic in
itself - leading up to the encirclement of Leningrad. This was a
period of high tension and chaos: children and women were
(sometimes) evacuated, not always successfully; workers volunteered
en masse for the Red Army or the narodnoe opolchenie (voluntary
battalions to support the troops even in combat); other male workers
and many women workers were sent outside the city to help dig
trenches, often getting caught up in the drama of refugees, retreating
soldiers, and the advancing G erman army. As Aleksei Koslovskii
noted, the first month of war was like «an entire epoch, » with the
Red Army heroically defending the motherland. 41 Wartime measures
were hurriedly introduced, including air raid sirens and patrols. The
shock of war and of rapid mobilization, along with the juxtaposition
of two radically different states of being - sacred peace and profane
war - set up one defining trope of Act one, a sense of surreality and
heroism that would mark myths and images of the war, as well as the
foundation of sacred and profane . The pre-war era was a moment of
peace , normality, personal enjoyment with friends and family, in
contrast to the chaos, destruction, and suffering. The beautiful summer
(normality) was interrupted by war. For Irina Zelenskaia , the June
weather and distant threat of Germany lulled her into a se nse of
security; she had to remind herself that there was a war on.42 Nina
Kobyzeva started her diary six months into the war; the first sixty
pages are a recollection of pre-war weeks. She even introduced her
diary like a novel, with a cast of characters, and she set up the tension
by juxtaposing pre-war life as one of freedom - a recent divorce
from a troubling husband, wanderings with friends along the banks of
the Gulf of Finland, preparing to meet the wonders of summertime
Leningrad .43 Aleksei Kozlovskii began his diary by noting how, in
June, he headed to his dacha and saw ominous silhouettes of planes
in the sky; the next day he was called back to his enterprise for
official news of events - an interruption of the usual state of affairs
in Leningrad in June. 44
Part of the logic of the first act was patriotism and volunteerism:
Leningrad would not surrender, the Red Army and Soviet people
would inevitably defeat the invaders (unlike the French, as some
noted) . As one communist noted later, he and comrades were ready
to fight. He noticed in the early days of war how Leningraders were
confident of victory. 45 Another, on June 22, noted how the city was
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calm and Leningraders were cold -blooded and ready to fight. In
meetings at city enterprises, workers were confident of victory and
voluntary mobilized for the front. 46 Molotov's speech signaled the
sta11 of war; Stalin's speech several weeks later made the Leader
seem a fellow comrade and human being (some commented on
hearing him sipping water during the speech). Some diarists felt
pangs of separation from family: husbands sent wives and children to
safety while bravely remaining to organize work. 47 Granted, not all
diarists had a rosy view or were skeptical of the state's ability to
properly organize defensive measures. Nina Kobyzova was worried of
a repeat of the chaos of the Russo-Finnish War, which «showed what
kind of order we have on the railroads during the smallest disorders.»48
Repeatedly she asked where advice would come from, for it was not
forthcoming from authorities.'19 She also noted that, while younger
male workers eagerly signed up for service (including her close
friend Petya), «[enterprise] bosses started agitating the people to
come forward and volunteer, and for image themselves were signing
up, but then they cunningly got out of the army.» 50
The hopes and masculinity of mobilizing for war in act one - in
many ways an ignorance of the horror of war, much in the same way
as Allied and German youth signed up happily for war in 1914,
only to realize the magnitude of the act later on - gave way to Act
two, which begins roughly in early November 1941. Here the
profanity emerges, bringing up the full force of sacred-profane
dichotomies; with the city, people began to realize the immediate
future will be much more difficult than imagined . One profanity,
noted with disbelief and even despair in diaries, is retreat, especially
retreat coupled with disorganization in the military and related
activities such as evacuations. 51 As the Germans begin to bomb
Leningrad, rumors emerged about traitors shooting up green signal
flairs to aid bombers. 52 When the Badaevskii food storage depot is
bombed and its contents destroyed, food supply deteriorates rapidly,
and the first feelings of hunger soon follow. News from the front is
negative: cities surrendered, the Wehrmacht again storming through
another country en route to victory. One high point in the drama is
the German attack on Moscow - finally some good news when the
Nazi war machine is turned back from the capital. However, the
tension of war continued as hunger and cold worsened. Electricity
and water supplies end, leaving people in darkness and needed to
walk to the Neva river for water. Tram service stops; people have to
walk to work (sometimes many kilometers), and trams stand still like
frozen corpses on the street, symbols of the terror of death about to
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arrive. In December the horror of starvation begins, which creates its
own set of sacred-profane dichotomies.
The tension or Act two is survival and acclimation to suffering
and death, structuring the other sacred-profane dichotomies that
follow. In a sense, Act two is the «act or profanity.» Act three is quite
long - roughly May 1942 to January 1944 - but it does partially
conform to the logic of drama. In Act three, the war and Blockade
become everyday, accepted, taken -fo r-granted. Sacred-profane
dichotomies are resolved or held in abeyance . The city's Party
leaders help prepare to supply the city for the winter and undertake
measures to clean the streets of corpses, dirt, and debris. Victory
gardens are planted in the summer; wooden homes are turned into
firewood. Even shelling and air raids , in 1941 among the more fearful
of events, become humdrum - which surprised some diarists. 53
Diarists mention shelling constantly, not only as an interruption of
normal life but also as the clarion of fear; but by 1942 people were
used to air-raid sirens and did not let them bother everyday activities,
e.g. standing in bread Iines. 54 (Partly this may have been due to the
punctuality of German shelling and air raids.) 55 The air raid sirens
and shelling were as much a part of Leningrad as the bridges and
canals, and people feared them less - they were accustomed to them,
and running for shelter each time invariably interrupted important
routines such as standing in line for food. (Some diarists also noted
that the Germans used shelling and accompanying sirens as a form of
psychological warfare - and so taking shelling and sirens for granted
may have been a form of resistance for some.) When the Blockade
was partially broken in 1943, life in the encircled city went on.
In fact, one defining logic for Act three is banality, as the
Blockade and war became part of Leningrad byt; the dramatic
sacred and profane become the everyday sacred and profane. Food
supply became more regular in 1942; despite unhappy military news
in the south, the engagement of the Wehrmacht there meant fewer
resources to storm the city. Despite forebodings that the Germans
would launch an all-out assault in autumn 1942, most diarists
seemed to worry less about the destruction or surrender of the city.
It was now a matter of holding out until the end (which would be
hastened by the Allies' opening of a second front). 56 Diary material
became less dramatic, more everyday. People carried on with work;
they fell in love, tended to everyday matters, cleaned house, took walks.
The drama of shelling was no longer drama; hunger remained, not as
bad as in the winter of 1941 - 42, and people were as accustomed to
it as humans can be. The horrors of war were relatively not as
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horrible as in the first six months, and the overall tide of war seemed
inexorably to be turning. People tried to resume their lives as best
they could. In consequence , diary entries sometimes trail off in Act
three. Gaps of weeks and even months appear in 1943. January
1944- May 1945 is usually a postscript or afterthought: the Blockade
is broken , people weep for joy. January 1944 is usually noted as a day
of supreme triumph, not only of the Red Army and USSR but
especially of Leningraders. After this the drama recedes. Many diaries
stop before the end of World War II: Victory Day is minor
compared to the end of the Blockade, itself minor compared to the
suffering of 1941-42.
Overall, the logic of drama shapes the sacred-profane structure in
two ways. First , it acts as a metanarrative into which other narratives
of experience and their sacred-profane logics are flt. Act one is the
appearance and assumption of the sacred. Act two is the appearance
of the profane, usually in extreme form. Act three involves partial
resolution or stagnation of contradictions. Second, Act one is the
sacred; Act two the profane; Act three a combination in the banal.
The lifting of the Blockade in January 1944, the ultimate sacred
moment of freeing the city from the Germans and suffering, ends the
drama of diaries. That this would not lead to resolution of the sacred profane dichotomies - in part because tribulations would continue,
this time at the hands of Stalin's leadership - was a bitter irony of
the experience .57

Homo sovieticus Meets homo economicus.
Collective Cooperation and the Prisoners' Dilemma
Part of the Soviet project was the creation of homo sovieticus: not
only anti-capitalist but also collectivist in norms and practice. Literature
on pre- Revolutionary and Soviet culture often touches on the
importance of collectivism; while in practice this was likely as much
. myth as reality, in discourse collectivism was certainly touted as
inherent in Russian and Soviet nature and a superior cultural trait
vis-a-vis the West. 58 Soviet collectivism was invoked in the enterprise
kollektiv and in communist collective practices, from communal
living and other services to public samokritika and the practice of
airing one's thoughts (as hiding something in the private was
potentially counter-revolutionary). 59 During the Blockade, collectivism
was tested on two fronts: first, in real practices of individual versus
collective tactics of survival; second, in how people framed their and
others ' tactics and behaviors through a individual-collectivist
dichotomy.60 On the first front, the classic Prisoners' Dilemma played
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out: did people cooperate and pool resources to survive, and did this
provide advantages , or did people focus on self to the exclusion of
others, perhaps ultimately hindering their efforts to survive'? For
close circles of friends and family where all survived, cooperative
efforts seem at work: different family members (including older
children) divided labor of survival. In some diaries one reads of
ritual divisions of labor, with some group members standing in lines
at bread stores while others scour the rynki for additional food or
other needed materials. These groups would also pool their ration
cards and, if possible, bring food from the workplace, dividing up the
bread , soup, ersatz chocolate, and the like between family members. 61
In general, one refrain in diary entries is how people constantly go to
others' places, or have them come over - sometimes for tea, but
other times to spend the night (or days and nights on end), sharing
not just tea but also bread and other food .
On the other hand, families or groups where people hid food
from each other or split up seemed to suffer -· or at least
complain more - about hunger and deprivation. For example,
diarist PI1tr Samarin complained that his wife hid rations she would
bring back from work. However, as Samarin himself describes , she
would also go off to work nearly every day, bring back food, stand in
various lines for food or other goods, while he sat at work or home
reading newspapers and wishing her were not too old to join the
Communist Party or eating at the «buffet» at his workplace (without
bring food home - or never mentioning doing so). Sometimes he
appreciated her effort and concern for him, but more often he
complained how she, younger than he, did not have appropriate
collective or cooperative values but rather valued herself over
others. 62 Supposedly she brought home not 500 but 150 grams of
sugar, or did not bring home anything for him at all (even though
on one occasion he ate his daily bread ration at his workplace
cafeteria while complaining she did not bring home additional food);
one time he claimed she hid food from him. 63 At any rate, even if
both survived, individual rather than cooperative behavior could at
the least create strains that added little to daily Blockade life.
On the second front - framing tactics and behaviors as individual
or collective (not just collection and use of food), and assigning
moral weights to one or the other - diaries provide more data, for
Leningraders intuitively saw the paradox of the Prisoners' Dilemma
transposed onto the sacred-profane dichotomy of capitalist
individualism versus Soviet collectivism, in the context of survival
and war. In other words, the ideal (and sometimes real behavior) of
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the moral economy of Soviet/ communist collectivism ran head -on
into the individualism of the Prisoners ' Dilemma and the desperation
of individual survival. 64 This should not be surprising: in cases of
extreme suffering and survival as in the Blockade, an individual likely
will experience conflict between the rationality of collective, cooperative
behavior (e .g. pooling food rations) and focusing on one 's own
survival first and foremost (e.g. eating all one's rations and perhaps
stealing others') . Further, this dichotomy was central to the Bolshevik
worldview; Soviet practices in the 1930s focused on creating the
collective, selfless individual, and it would be surprising of people did
not turn to this logic when structuring their narratives. For example,
one theme that winds through Irina Zelenskaia's account of the
Blockade is the issue of individualism and its negative impact on the
war effort and environment. In particular, individualism came out
most strongly as people were starving: many people thought mostly
about how «to defend the rights of their stomachs by any means. »65
It is clear why this theme is prominent: she oversaw the organization
of food distribution at her enterprise's cafeteria, and she saw firsthand
the tensions and conflicts that occurred as the miniscule rations took
their toll over that horrible first winter - in fact, she compared the
food lines there to «some kind of [military] front.» Hunger created
or augmented love for oneself and weakened other morals and
princi ples.t' 6 She dubbed this the «dictatorship of the stomach ,» and
while she also felt the intense pangs of hunger, she consistently
claimed that she had to keep active and exercise all her willpower
not to let hunger take over her reason. 67 Zelenskaia 's observations
and criticisms of individualism were not confined to food lines. In
one instance, she noted how an incendiary bomb started a fire on
Yasilievskii Island. Only one woman tried to put it out; she failed, and
Zelenskaia commented in disgust, «Such coUectivists!» 68 As for suffering,
Zelenskaia noted that over time people seemed to care less and less
for their fellow Leningradcrs. 69 She helped out those wasting away
(e.g. bringing extra food or sharing rations), but she received no
encouragement from bosses; young girls at the enterprise sewed their
. own clothes but did not sew clothes for soldiers, and when Zelenskaia
suggested this would be a good idea, she got no support from
colleagues.70 As well, those who died were those who could not
exercise self-discipline; they did not try to help themselves and, by
becoming idle, could not deflect their attention from hunger. 71 As a
result, they lost the will to live. 72
Nina Kobyzova as well coded much behavior around her, especially
in 1941 -42, through this sacred-profane dichotomy. For example, at
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the outbreak of war, she noted how many women around her tried to
avoid any service to the war effort or scrambled madly to get onto
evacuation lists. One can appreciate the desire to evacuate with the
Germans approaching , but for Kobyzova, using networks or various
excuses that others could use but did not (e .g. family and children ,
accompanying evacuated factory equipment to guard it) smacked or
cowardice .73 As water pipes froze, people turned to the Neva and
canals for water, and Kobyzova noted how crowds cutting through
Fontanka ice acted rudely , loudly arguing and shoving each other
with water buckets -- another picture she would remember all her
lire. 74 At one point she suggested that truly moral behavior meant
thinking first and foremost of general Soviet victory, not only about
surviving and breaking the Blockade (a local front on the overall war).
rn other words, the general victory was more important than
Leningrad - admittedly, a view I seldom saw in diaries.75 Jn early
1942, reflecting on how much her mother did for her during the
worst days of the winter of 1941 - 42 , Kobyzova recalled how one
woman at her enterprise, also a mother, refused to share bread or
money with her children. This was in contrast to Kobyzova 's
situation - in both cases, mothers had a chance to help their youngadult daughters, but one refused. In fact, this other mother -- clearly
juxtaposed to Kobyzova 's own mother - accepted money from her
son (who might have been at the front, although this was not clear)
but did not even share that. In one short entry, Kobyzova sets up the
individualist-collective, selfish-sharing dichotomy - not in terms of
the rationality of sharing (the logic of the Prisoners ' Dilemma) rather, she framed it in moral terms of the normality of cooperation
and the abnormality of individualism.
Zelenskaia and Kobyzeva were not the only diarists to structure
much of their narrative in terms of sacred collective versus profane
individual; one diarist I read who does not raise this issue was a
young boy who tried to refrain from judging others. 76 The collectiveindividual dichotomy sometimes was wrapped into other dichotomies
I discuss below-sometimes explaining them, sometimes explained by
them - and so I let data below augment this discussion. In general,
however, other diarists also expressed disillusionment or disgust at
individualist, selfish behavior they saw around them. Red Army
soldiers, for example, were sacrificing themselves for the defense of
the Motherland; children, the elderly and sick, and the less-well-off
were starving and dying in Leningrad. At the same time, Party
officials and speculators were not living so badly. 77 Tensions within
families emerged because of perceptions of individualism, i.e . that
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someone was free riding and not pulling his/ her weight. Kobyzeva
turned against her mother's «boyfoend» (initials B.A.) because he
contributed little to the survival of their small living group; even
though she saw he was ill, Kobyzeva, her mother, and B.A. 's
daughter continued to seek out food , go to work, clean the house,
gather firewood, and the like even as they became weaker from
starvation and the cold. 78 Kedrov became ashamed at the behavior
he saw at Party-sponsored banquets: for example, how people at one
banquet ate food from each others' plates (including his) or greedily
and not so slyly pocketed extra food (e .g. bread rolls) . 79 In contrast,
diarists often noted- sometimes with a sense of pleasure - how they
and friends/ colleagues shared their apartment space, food, and time
with each other; when many diarists slept away from home, they did
so not only at work but also at friends ' places. Perhaps the ultimate
expression is P,1tr Samarin 's remorse at being alone in the latter
years of the Blockade. I explore his expression of the individualcollective dichotomy below, as it is directly related to the moral
economy of provision. For now, I note here that Samarin repeats
feelings of despair over being alone. The stress from the struggle for
food and against hunger ultimately led to a fall-out between him and
his wife; this left him alone, which he felt his resulting state of being
a solitary individual as intense loneliness, negative and abnormal.

Suffering and Dying: the «Leningrad Death»
Images and data on mortality in the Blockade are staggering:
perhaps I. I million deaths overall, including at least 52,000 in
December 1941 alone. Death, like the constant shelling, became part
of everyday Blockade life. This was in stark contrast to the ideal
Soviet socialist society, where death was of two types: that inflicted
by the state (the agent of the socialist society) against enemies of the
people, and death as fulfillment of the socialist life course, the end to
a comrade's usefulness towards the revolutionary ideal. And even so,
death and disposal in the 1930s was a problematic interaction of the
ideals of Party elite and aktiv, on the one hand, and citizens, on the
other. 80 Of course, the 1930s saw plenty of innocent victims of stateinflicted terror or accidents of forced industrialization and
collectivization, although these were often framed in propaganda and
even in popular consciousness as prices for progress or the result of
true wreckers and enemies. 81 In this sense, Soviet society was not so
different from modern capitalist societies: death inflicted by the state
towards enemies (external and internal), accidents rationalized away.
However, if the war clarified the boundaries between sacred and
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profane, it blurred the same boundaries between ideal and practice .
The state that killed enemies could not protect its people, and it
sometimes turned on them in the name of security. Further, while the
Party struggled to eradicate remnants of tradition, especially religion ,
that were part of commemorating death (especially funeral rites) , it
tried to create alternative sacred rites - socialist music (marches, not
religious dirges), socialist disposal of bodies (e.g. cremation), and
commemoration not through prayer but a recital of the individual's
contributions towards collective socialist progress and reminders of
how those present should continue such socialist work .
The Leningrad death was bereft of such sacred rites. An important
part of the process of confronting and categorizing death was
witnessing the incredible number of corpses on the streets in the
winter of 1941 - 42 , the result of starvation . Diarists first heard of
starvation deaths, and then they began to witness them; and then
they witnessed the horror of corpses left on the streets, as relatives
had too little money or strength to bury them. (The horror of
corpses with chunks of Oesh missing, and stories of cannibalism,
emerge later.) What they saw was not part of the pre -socialist or
socialist sacred rites , but rather emblematic of the profanity of the
Blockade . Bodies were not disposed through formal funerals and
graves. Those who died at home or work were left on the streets or
in masses near disposal points, wrapped in linen (but not always).
Those who died from starvation and weakness while en route from
one point to another in the cold of winter 1941-42 rested where
they fell. We recoil from the simple and occasional photographs of
starving Leningraders dragging linen-wrapped corpses on sleds along
snowy streets; diarists saw these every day , up close and in person .
The corpses (not always intact) were a reality that imposed itself;
they were not illustrations in a book that they could put down. One
diarist noted how corpses were thrown (not laid) into mass graves;
as to the frozen corpses along the streets, · some naked and missing
Oesh, «I will remember that picture all my life.» 82
How did Leningraders make sense of suffering and death? The
sacred and profane appeared again but blended in a curious way.
Some diarists commented on starvation as easy death: one grew weak
and descended into death resting, while walking or in bed. 83 Yet for
many, starvation was not normal. It was the opposite of modernity,
especially promises of Soviet modernity. One gut reaction was horror:
not just at the number of corpses that first winter, but how the dead
appeared on the streets, under bridges, in cold apartment rooms or
basements. From this emerged a sacred-profane dichotomy: the «good
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death» in the context of care , and the «Leningrad death » through
unnatural, man-made starvation and without care and concern .81 Part
of this construction was the lack of a cof1in (grab) . Kobyzova noted
how it was impossible to see fewer than twenty corpses on the streets
as she went home from work. Her reaction : «What a horror- a dead
person without a coflin.» 85 Aleksandr Kedrov related how one radio
employee whom he knew buried his father, but he explained what
«buried» meant , implying the profanity of the Leningrad burial: «he
simply placed [his late father] between other corpses lying around at
that so-called ccmetery. »86 Lencncrgo/ Sevkabel planning official and
cafeteria aid Irina Zelenskaia thought conins and proper burials were
sacred. (The rhetoric of death emerges throughout Zclenskaia's
overall narrative: she coded evacuations as «flights from death» and
coined the phrase «Leningrad death» to refer to Boris ' death from
starvation - in contrast to dying at the front, in combat.) 87 She went
out of her way on several occasions to maintain the sacred rites, in
contrast to the profanity of corpses littering the streets without any
care. As corpses began to lin e the streets, she made sure to note in
her diary that the burial officia ls would only bury bodies that winter
in exchange for bread. 88 When one «Uncle Petya» died , it became
clear the authorities would not do anything , so she and her son-inlaw Boris decided to act. Weak as he was from starvation, Boris tried
to build a coffin . Zelenskaia used her car - one of the few occasions
she did so - to take Uncle Petya 's body to the cemetery. 89 A few
months later her friend Mina died from starvation, and Zelenskaia
decided to forego the burial bureaucracy. She and friends created a
makeshift coffin, took the body in her car and quietly parked in an
alley near a cemetery, and dug a shallow grave. Even then, Zelenskaia
noted that there was no real moment of farewell , as in normal ,
legitimate funeral rites - but it was the best they could do. (Zelenskaia
and those with her brought a kilogram of bread as a potential bribe ,
but they came across nobody who might oppose their ritual.) As
Zclenskaia noted, «Only a few Leningraders this winter were provided
with this kind of funeral. »91>
This was the real horror of the Leningrad death: it was the
dehumanization of death. As many diarists note , the corpses on the
street stopped bothering them , as if they were no longer people but
objects. Undoubtedly, the rumors or observations of people eating
corpses (often indirect evidence, such as missing flesh) reinforced
the profane category of the person as object for use, whether by the
state or another starving individual. Cannibalism may have been a
forbidden topic in post-war accounts, but diarists did not shy away
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from it. One diarist wrote that one coworkers at his factory went
insane after discovering he had eaten human flesh (perhaps bought
at the 1ynok); a worker at another shopfloor of his factory was
arrested for killing and eating several coworkers , and worker at
another factory (he heard) had killed and eaten one of his children
before going insane and dying.91 Some diarists could not mention it
directly - but they alluded to it indirectly, suggesting that they
understood the topic (cannibalism) and that any reader would
understand it as well. Nikolai Gorshkov remarked about rumors of
cannibalism but noted , «it is impossibly difficult to write about this. »92
Ostroumova-Lebedcva hinted at cannibalism (and other horrifying
stories) , only to comment that she would not write about it. 93
Jn entries for the first months of 1942, diarists nearly always note
the corpses , as if this were the height of Act two. 94 And many diarists
noted that something inside all of them had changed as a result.
Kobyzova understood that something had changed inside all
Leningraders in this regard: as the snow melts and reveals yet more
corpses, some with body parts missing , she notes that this no longer
makes an impression on her- although the very act of recording her
observations and noting this suggests just the opposite . «Interesting will I come to myself at some point , and how will I react to this
survival? I will somehow have to survive all this all over again when
I will be a normal personordinary corpses lying around on the streets
make no kind of impression on me. In general, Leningraders now are
not worried by anything except food. »95 Irina Zclenskaia saw the
dehumanization of death as part of a wider problem of individualism
and survival: as people became uncaring towards each other in their
drive for individual survival , they also became coarse towards those
who suffered and died around them . She feared one key to survival in
Leningrad was indifference to others - which explained why
Leningraders were unmoved and ambivalent about constant shelling
or seeing death up close on the streets. 96 Nikolai Gorshkov agreed:
hungry Leningraders were indifferent to the fates of those who had
fallen or lost consciousness on the streets, seldom giving any aid. 97
Sometimes indifference seemed odd: in some diaries the death of
close friends and family attracts less notice than other topics.
Zelcnskaia painfully watched close friends and family waste away; but
one diarist barely noted the death of his father, 98 and another youth
barely mentioned the passing of his father and brothers, preferring to
write constantly about what he had to cat that day. 99
Ultimately, one outcome of the Leningrad death was the bond
it creat ed , at least in the estimation of some . In particular, surviving
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the terrible winter of 1941 - 42 created a potentially common
identity - a community of sufferers who had starved and shivered
as well, while living and contributing at times to the war effort. 100
The same diarist who noted this juxtaposed the ubiquity of the
Leningrad death with powerful signs of life: in April 1942 she saw
a living dog. The significance was twofold : it symbolized both the
horrors of the Blockade (eating dogs and cats, and on rare
occasions people) and survival through such a nightmare reinforcing the sacred and profane of the «good death» and ,
logically , the «good life.»

Moral Economy of War and Provision:
Partici paring in the Profane
Soviet civilization was supposed to be superior because it
transcended the evil and irrationality of capitalism. The sacred ideal
of anti-capitalism involved control via the state as agent of the
working class. If the reality of the 1930s was one of constant
shortages, at least this could be rationalized as the price for rapid
progress towards the socialist ideal. Further, while the Soviet economy
used money, it was more an accounting device than a story and
expression of value. As in market economics, money could equate the
amount of labor one had expended - it was as if storing one's labor
for later expenditure . However, in capitalism, money can take on
value independent of the exchange of labor, as happens in
speculation . 101 Hence the supposed superiority of Soviet socialism money had no independent meaning. State-based production and
provision would, in theory, eliminate the nexus of money and , at the
same time, of commodification and exploitation. Interestingly, war
economics are not so different - increased state control over
production and distribution under capitalism does not end private
property or money's multi pie meanings, but it does mitigate them.
Thus, war (and especially the Blockade) tested the Soviet moral
economy of state-based provision free of the influences of property
and money. In the end, that test created a powerful contradiction
between the Soviet idea of state control and provision versus the
reality of relying on quasi-market mechanisms and practices for
survival.
While the state-run economy could maintain production during
the war and even evacuate entire factories to the east, it could not
control all facets of economic transactions even before 1941. With a
weakened state and survival paramount, underground market behavior
returned, sometimes with a vengeance. Some economic liberalization
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was condoned by the regime, but this more often related to small time artisanal production - and certainly not to food . 102 The rynok,
akin to a farmers ' market or bazaar, was legal , although trading via
money was illegal or gray (selling a good at its production cost was,
technically, not illegal). While there was plenty of buying and selling
for money, people also bartered for bread or other goods in kind ,
which was on more solid legal ground , even if the value for goods
was expressed in money (e.g. 400 rubles per kilo of bread and I 00
rubles per bottle of wine meant four bottles of wine for one kilo of
bread). This legal loophole could become the entering wedge for
market relations to grow. The shadow economy had already emerged
from the 1930s, and to give neoclassical economics its due , when
commodities arc valued but scarce, their value (however expressed
and embodied) will grow. Yet this was anathema to the very essence
of Soviet socialism. Further, non-monetary trade in bread and
commodities, autonomous and outside state control, meant that the
market trade in bread and other needed commodities did not always
fit perfectly into the scared-profane dichotomy: with the money link
sometimes absent, such exchange could be coded as less profane in
the Soviet anti-capitalist logic. To add to the complexity the moral
economy and its challenges and contributing to the complexity of
monetization and the moral economy was how the state made
several drives for war bonds; Party activists would ritually campaign
for workers to sign over several weeks or months of their wages to
the state for the construction of tanks or other military materiel.
That is , money still gained important symbolic power from the state
as well as from the rynok. Thus, going into the Blockade, a potential
sacred- profane dichotomy was ready to emerge: the sacred of fair,
just provision of goods on the princi pie of provision to those who
need or earn, versus the profane princi pie of provision going to those
who have the advantage of superior reserves of capital (economic/
material, social).
Diarists saw this contradiction in operation as the first Blockade
winter set in. One simple expression of the contradiction of moral
economy of war and provision versus market logic was the constant
appearance of one oft-met diary entry: monetary prices for bread at
the rynok. 103 Some diarists simply stated as fact the prices for
different commodities over time ; even this, without commentarythe fact of recording this observation (several times as prices
changed) - suggests the importance of the money nexus and a
market-like mechanism. Other diarists commented on high prices.
Regardless of editorial comment, a reading of numerous diaries makes
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clear that people found the monetization of food and other needed
commodities (especially during the life -and -death struggle of the
Blockade , when one would hope for more cooperative , survivaloricnted behavior) sufficiently significant to expend time and energy
to record such data . In other words , a rudimentary market logic had
survived the 1930s. This wartime market for bread , butter, cigarettes
and matches, and other needed goods, I suggest, has a dual meaning.
First, it suggests the survival of market relations and monetary
commodification - the supposed antithesis of Soviet socialism- making
its appearance during the most trying moment of the Soviet system.
Second, this reinforced the individual-collective dichotomy, albeit
indirectly: the market was a place of individuals gaining Crom the
needs of other individuals.
The irony was not lost on everyone . The greater irony, however,
was how people who could be critical of a monetary market for
bread - and in monetary exchanges in general - could also
participate in it without commenting on themselves or noting
various contradictions. Some diarists, like Samarin, noted the market
for food but did not pa1iici pate in it; in Samarin 's case, it is unclear
whether this is out of conviction, lack of money or something to
barter, or other reason. 104 Other diarists, such as Kedrov, saw even
non-monetary trade in bread as profane , because those trading
probably had more money than they could count. Such people «live,
more sated than any of us. Oh, such swindlers, such scoundrels. » 105
Kcdrov also commented negatively on his boss ' daughters, who
looked well-fed and well-dressed - he could not stand to be in their
company long. 106 Related was criticism of how one actually obtained
food or other goods: via formal procedures that, in theory, should be
fair; via the money nexus of the market; or via the profane practice
of informal patronage networks, i.e. blat. Bfat could evoke powerful
negative comments and connotations, even if obtaining food could be
difficult in the absence of perSDnal networks. Pntr Samarin quickly
discovered this. Obtaining his proper ration of food at his workplace
canteen was often difficult because he did not have proper connections
with the staff or bosses in charge of food. «Without bfat - nothing,»
was his comment. 107 In 1943, with a weak network structure that led
him constantly to feel alone, he discovered that no one would help
him obtain wine or vodka for the November 7 holiday. 108 Samarin
was not the only person to note the importance of bfat. Tatiana
Kartomysheva exploded in one entry about the injustice of blat and
networks. «Protection» and blat were bad enough before the war;
now , in desperate times, they were worse . To buttress her complaint
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about widespread, immoral blat, Kartomysheva told a story (whose
accuracy is impossible to corroborate) of doctors refusing to give
milk to weak children on the grounds they would die soon anyway.
Instead, they gave that milk to acquaintances' childrcn. 109 Shopfioor
worker Ivan Savinkov believed there was a «food aristocracy» or
those who organized its supply (e .g. food servers and guards at
enterprise canteens) - they would make sure they all received extra
rations, which they could consume or trade. He claimed such people
stood out for looking well-fed and having good shoes or jewelry. 110
The case of ironic critique in the face of panici pation comes
from Komsomolets and communist believer Aleksei Evdokimov. 111
His account is peppered with references to money in various
contexts. He is always sending money to his family; he claims he
cannot carry money in his pocket while he ICars that they may be
hungry (a tacit admission of the importance of money in Stalin 's
USSR). 112 His response to the raising of the bread ration in February
1942 is to comment that «speculators» lowered the price or bread at
the rynok. In that same month the appearance of the market gets to
him, and in one passage he makes his first major critique or it:
«There are sales [prodazhal without any shyness, here in the [bread}
store or near it. Speculators stuff their pockets. At the Rzhevki ,
Porokhovyc, or any other rynok, on street corners or in stores , there
arc flea markets so crowded that people are giving stuff, sometimes
junk from 1935 .» 11 3 Yet despite his criticisms, he engaged in market
behavior. For example, he wrote that in the second half of February
1942 he paid 1500 rubles for bread; he commented, «I bought myself
life,» apparently without openly recognizing the irony of «buying»
life in context the Soviet utopia . (He obtained the 1500 rubles
through an acquaintance.) 11 4 In March he used his bonus from work
to buy more bread, and in late March he listed in his diary an
account of money he spent on one day for food ( 1200 rubles): «So
there 's how much life costs a person .» 11 5 In July 1942 Evdokimov
even bought a record player from one Leningradcr preparing to
evacuate the city; as he noted, money had gained «great weight» in
the blockaded city. 11 6 In January 1943 he gave 900 rubles of his
future salary for a state bond; this left his with little, and he had
difficulty borrowing from his enterprise (and he was personally in
debt to others). 11 7 As a result, he turned to doing repairs for others for
extra money; he also bought a broken record player and extra parts
for 32 rubles and resold it for 500 rubles. That is, the good
communist Komsomolets was engaging in a wartime market
economy - and even proudly showing the fruits of his labor~ 11 ~
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While he engaged the money economy of the Blockade, he admitted
surprise that neighbors one floor up were arrested for counterfeiting
money (the police found 6000 counterfeit rubles and counterfeit
ration cards) --something he admitted he could not believe before
when he had heard such news. 119 To add to his money woes, in April
1943 he had to sell shoes and a new coat , but in June 1943 the Party
started another drive to collect funds for state bonds , eating up part
of his salary- driving him to ask where all his money was going to
and why he was always poor. 120
Good Komsomolets Evdokimov mentioned his and others'
sufferings in the Blockade: hunger, disease (for him, TB) , shelling,
cold. In his narrative, however , money is more prominent than in
other accounts, including those or diari sts less well off. While he
participates willingly in the money economy,he seems to retreat into
Stalin 's promises , especially towards the end of the war - returning
to socialist competitions of shopfloor production, participating in
Party lectures, even wondering if he is a fool for putting up with
silence from his wife (which he thinks indicated an end to their
marriage) . 121 His criticisms suggest a sacred-profane dichotomy, but
survival forces him to partake in the profane. He even notes such
activities, but he also retreats into Stalinist propaganda and Paiiy
activities - as if engaging in acts of religious repentance reviving the
sacred to cleanse him of the profane. The Blockade, it seems, was for
[vdokimov and others a school in economic realities in the face of
Soviet ideals. Certainly the shadow economy colored those ideals in
the 1930s; but in the moment of life-or-death, the market reappeared
with a vengeance and delivered that which the formal system
sometimes only promised - bread.

Conclusion: Interpretations, Meanings,
and Making Sense of the Senseless
On Friday, July 6, I began this essay, with Ekho Moskvy in the
background. Under discussion was the popular rating of Petersburg
governor Valentina Matvienko. After the usual sociological analysis
came the turn for listeners to call in. The first few were pensioners
(a man and a woman) and a seemingly middle-aged man. All complained
about prices and the difficulty of life in Putin's wealthy new Russia one powerful expression Uudging from the tone of their voices)
were prices of bread and ukrop. Bread and ukrop - echoes of the
Blockade. While these callers likely were thinking not of the Blockade
itself but of staples of everyday meals, the similarities in claims and
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discourse were eerily striking - as if following ascri pt from the past ,
already taken-for-granted, far in the background but always present
and exerting its influence even today. The experience of war continues
to matter. This should not be surprising: after the end of World War
II, police and Pany informants noted that some people harbored
were critical of the Pa1ty and regime for low rations, 122 and even an
self-proclaimed communist had to note how his son asked, in
September 1947 , «Papa, will there be such a time when we will eat
our fill at the table?» 123 Aleksei Evdokimov, reflecting in only January
1942 o[ the horrors he had seen, wrote, «I hope that for me the day
will come when we will all remember all this as something unhuman,
unrepeatable , extraordinary, and heroically survived.» 124
The experience of the Blockade as an extreme case of war deeply
affected its victims, many of whom realized this at the time . Irina
Zelenskaia noted in July 1942 that everyone had become cruel, cold,
and insensitive towards the suffering of others . She and others easily
recalled the faces of the starving - in Zelenskaia's case , the face of
a small boy in line at her cafeteria who only stared at the food that
by rules he could not receive . Only in July 1942 was some «human
feeling» returning ; only then did she cry over the death of son- in law Boris, who had died four months earlier. 12 5 Despite the return of
a semblance or normality - evidenced by everyday banalities
dominating her diary accounts - Nina Kobyzeva intensely felt the
loss of her close friend Petya, who died at the front. As her own
relations with her boyfriend worsened (in part due to his drinking
and lack of attention to her), she returned to Pctya as an example of
the sacred individual lost in the war: she constantly remembers him,
wishes he were still around, wonders what they would be doing now,
and recalls pre-war memories in which he figured. 126
As James McPherson noted, for thousands of American soldiers
(especially from the North) the experience of the Civil War created
anew sense of identity and norms, including emancipation for blacks
(contentious at the start of the war, and especially with the
Emancipation Proclamation). 127 The experience of World War 11
helped create the Soviet nation and at least partially legitimated the
Soviet political and economic systems - but even then , only to an
extent, as soldiers and citizens felt they deserved a political and
economic thaw (including reforms of co!lectivization). 128 The war
experience also could not but have altered constructions of social
and political normality, structured through binary pairs of sacred and
profane. This paper used the Blockade , a radical experience of war by
non-combatants, to illuminate what these dichotomies were and how
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they emerged. I briefly noted some or the sacred-profane dichotomies
and suggested a more detailed list. What underlies many of these
dichotomies is a sense of personal dignity. During the Blockade, Soviet
socialism faced little real criticism. Fair provision of food and other
goods and services - reflecting the moral economy of Soviet
socialism - was reinforced, not contradicted, in diarists' narratives.
Narratives of death and individualism suggested a paradox: increased
sense of self (or selfishness), versus increased sense of dignity of the
self, seen in repulsion to the lack of dignity in the Leningrad death.
I would also like the venture one hypothesis: the experience of
war created a template of sacred-profane dichotomies that, taken as
a whole, contributed to the expectation of the post-war system ,
regime, and policies. Thanks to NKVD surveillance of the population,
the regime cannot have been entirely ignorant of this (although we
should not assume they were perfectly cognizant of it, either). The
interaction of expectations and real policies resulted in real popular
legitimacy of the Soviet Union as system and political community
(nation) for a time. I would further hypothesize that if expectations
were not met - i.e. the regime did not sufficiently satisfy such
expectations as a political thaw on several fronts as a reward for
sacrifice , as well as recognition of sacrifice (e.g. rebuilding Leningrad 's
physical infrastructure and status) - the result would be the
«Superfluous person » that writers in the nineteenth century noticed. 129
While feelings of «superfluousness» would likely be of degree, they
could create an interesting disconnect between popular hopes and
beliefS versus the regime's claims (through its elite or propagandapolice apparatuses). In this situation, the Soviet «nation» - if not
born in the war, then certainly baptized and raised in it - could
predominate over Party, socialism, and Revolution as the main totem
for Soviet legitimacy. Such superfluousness could act as the Achilles'
heel for any political hegemony. Paradoxically, the war strengthened
the Soviet nation, system , and leadership while sowing the seeds for
its downfall. The superfluous war generation (including blokadniki)
would remain loyal because the regime - not meeting expectations
and increasing both repression and bribery as the basis for loyalty deprived them of ritualistic reproduction of that meaning. 130 That is,
the regime co-opted the war through a selected menu of meanings some that fulfilled expectations of sacred and profane, others which
paid Ii p service - or the alternative of repression. Superfluous
survivors supported the regime not through positive attraction, but
because there was nowhere else to turn - theirs was a «captive
loyalty. » They did not want wartime sacrifices to be in vain. 131 Future
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generations would see the war as history, taken and (mis)uscd by the
regime for gain , reproducing the cynicism th at helped bring down
the Communist Part y and the USSR.
While more work and data are needed , a few things seem clear. The
intensity of suffering and conflict in general - because of the
ferocity and power of the enemy - helped solidify a sense of unity,
turning Soviet society into a community or sufferers. Pre-Revolutionary
Russia fell apart because the war frustrated as much as it victimized;
experiences of World War I I, especially the Blockade , were too seve re
to frustrate. Survival came through individual and collective tac tics.
In the end the political elite ma y have gained temporary capital.
What did emerge from World War II was the Sovie t nation; from the
Blockade , a sense or first among equals within that new political
community - a status that Stalin and th e Moscow-centered
Communist elite recognized , and against which they and successors
would fight until 2000, when a native Leningrader would take
command of the country.

NOTES
NB : In the notes the following abbreviat ions are used:
GMMOBL State Memorial Museum of th e Defense and Blockade
of Leningrad , Written Documents Collection (Gosudarst vc nn yi
Memorial'nyi Muzci Oborony i Blokady Leningrada , Rukopis' nyi
Dokumental'nyi Fond) , St. Petersburg.
RNB: Russian National Library, Written Records Collection
(Rossiiskaia natsional ' naia biblioteka im. Saltykova-Shchedrina,
Rukopis'nyi Fond), St. Petersburg.
EGA: Central State Archive (Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv) ,
state rather than Party archive, St. Petersburg.
EGA/PD: Central State Archive of Historical -Political Documents
(Tsentral 'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Istoricheskikh - Politicheskikh
Dokumentov), former Leningrad Party archive, St. Petersburg.
Archives arc organized through hierarchical systematization: fond
(f., collection), opis (op. , register) , delo (d. , file) , list (! .,page), unl ess
otherwise noted . (Some materials had not yet been archived and are
referred to as «Akt ,» i.e. the formal act of accepting materials into the
archive.)

***
For an alternative overview. sec Amir Weiner. Making Sense of War. The
Second World War and the f ate of the Bolshevik Revo lution (Princeton :
1

269

Princeton University Press. 2001) , chapter I. I am not sa ying that there is no
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2
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).
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1
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University of California Press, 1995).
5
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6
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26-52. Interest ingly. note the title of the book: «Stalinism» and «Nazism.» Wh y
not «Stalinism and Hitlerism»? Or «Bolshev ism and Nazism »'1 The perso nal
(Stalin) remains power ful in the study of the USSR.
' Suny, «Stalin and H is St alinism», p. 51. My itali cs for «Convincingly. »
' Druzhba (Vclikaia Otechestvennaia Voina) suggests Soviet society and
politics are best interpret ed through the prism of th e war, especially th e
problematic int ersec tion of people 's real experi ence s and popular expectations.
versus th e regi me 's claims and policies.
9
Weiner. Making Sense of War, p. 14: Nina Tumark in, The Living and the
Dead: the Rise and rail of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New York: Bas ic
Books. 1994) , and «The War of Remembrance.» in Richard Stites (ed.) , C ulture
and Entertainment in Wartime Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
1995) , pp . 194-207.
J() Drnzhba, Velikaia Otec hestvennai a Yoina, p. 51.
11
E.g. Jay Winter, Sites of Memo ry, Sites of Mourning: Great War in
European Cultural Hi story Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
12
This is not a clai m that the war is entirely ignored , either. For example , Julie
Hessler's interesting work on wartime economic reforms - like much economic
history of the USSR in general -- shows a more complicated picture of state society rel ations and policies than the usual historiography has always implied .
Juli e Hessler, «A Postwar Perestroika') Toward a History of Private Enterprise in
the USSR, » Slavic Review vol. 57 #3 (fall 1998) , pp. 526-543.
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of Benefits for Civil War Veterans,» Political Science Quarterly vol. 108 (1993) ,
pp. 85-l 16; Eugen Weber, Peasants Into Frenchmen (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1976) ; Miguel Ce nteno, Blood and Debt : War and the Nation-State in
Latin America (University Park: Penn State Press, 2002).
14
Theda Skocpol , States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge
U niversity Pres<> . 1979) and Defe nding Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge:
Harvard lJ niversi ty Press, 1992) .
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Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital. and European States, AD 990-1992
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990).
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ir, Positing the importance of popular meanings docs not deny the power of
elites and states. f"urther, recent research of democracies suggests pluralism should
not be sold short. Cf. Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza , «Soc ial Responsiveness in
Developed Democracies. » American Sociological Review vol. 7 1 (2006) . pp. 474494. In non-democratic regimes, popular opinion and meanings may be less
overtly important. but the very fact that dictatorial regimes - especially the
Bolshevik regime - - devoted resources to propaganda and internal policing (and
spying) suggests that the elites did take popular opinion. a nd especially differing
belief5. seriously.
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Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1939).
1
' James C. Scott , Domination and the Art of Resista nce (New Have n: Yale
University Press, 1990) ; Timur Kuran . «The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary
Surprises, » American Journal of Sociology vol. I 00 ( 1995). pp. 1528- 1551.
19
Cf. Frank Dobbin. r:orging Industrial Policies (!\ew York: Cambridge
University Press , 1994) ; Liah Greenfeld. Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1992) .
2
° For example , th e general trauma of the Vietnam experience - to both
combatants and the relative secure home population - became a touchstone for
presidential politics for decades afterwards. Debates over military engagement
since Vietnam have been framed in th e diffe rent lessons of that experience. As
well. the Civil War was central in the creation of a unified American national
ide ntity - consider the well-known anecdote that before the Civil War the
United States was referred to as «these» (plural) and «this» (singular) a fterwards .
The trauma of war made soldiers look for meaning , including the defense of a
unified political and social community. James McPherson. For Cause and
Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998) .
21 Ales ' Adamovich and Daniil Granin. Blokadnaia kniga (Leningrad: Lenizdat ,
1984) . p. 21 and pp. 165-184.
n Occupation raises issues of inhabitants subjected to an external state 's
direct control. A more appropriate model for occupied territories is a colonial
model. In the Leningrad Blockade , this was not an issue to complicate the picture
and analysis.
' 3 There are other historical reasons: Leningrad was one of the first «herocities,» and its experience is part of the construction of heroic Soviet images that
began to take the place of Revolutionary symbolism after the war; the Zhdanov
Affair and inadequate post-war efforts at reconstruction (in no small part on
directions from Moscow) suggest that the Blockade provided Leningrad with a
competitive advantage of cultural capital vis-a-vis Moscow and the Kremlin
leadership. Further, and more generally, the Blockade allows us to look at citizen
non -combatants rather than soldiers alone . Soldiers are often the focus of studies
about war, and non-combatants appear in studies of post-war politics ,
reconstruction , and culture.
24
Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind, especially chapters 1-2.
25
Aleksandr Kedrov, an assistant factory manager, began his diary with the
claim that he was writing not a work of art but a «chronicle of events and of my
survival.» TsGAIPD , f. 4000, op. l l , d. 44 , l. la.
26 This is McPherson ' s strategy for looking at soldiers ' letters, cf. For Cause
and Comrades.
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,- This is prob lematic: when a diari st does not mention so me eve nt or
obse rvation. it could mean : I) th e writer did not observe it or ignored it for
whateve r reason: 2) the eve nt was take n-for-granted and not considered worth
mentioning beca use it was pan of the usual social background ; or 3) the writ er
was afraid to bring the issue up . Without the ability to go hack in tim e and
perform ex pe rim ents akin to those conducted hy Harold G arfinkel and
ethnomethodologists - perturbing usual so cial practices to di scover what is
wken -fo r-gra nted , and thus ignored or assumed away ·-- so lvi ng this issue is
difficult. One way around thi s is to ascertain whether th ere is a deeper underlying
logic to what people writ e: the eve nts they note, how th ey di sc uss several eve nt s
or probl e m~ , etc. Thus, the surface impression provides a glimpse at the construction
of mea ning; the deeper structures th at tie things together might provide insights
int o what was taken-for-gra nt ed. Wh at eve nts or problems a rc co nsistently
ignored as well as discussed') (For example , docs Stalin come up at all - and
if so, what trigge rs his mentioning , a nd the capitalization of his name , or not'1 )
'' As related by one Blockade survivor, Adamovich a nd Granin , 13lokadnaia
kniga , p. 331 .
·"' TsGAIPU , f. 25, op. 10, d. 330, l. 17.
TsCiAIPD , f. 2.5. op. JO, d. 330. I. 11 .
'' Hellbec k. Revolutio n on My Mind , p. 86.
'•' Erving Goffman. Prese nt ation of Self in Everyday Life (Garde n City. l\Y:
Doub leday. 1959) an d Fra me Analys is (Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1974)
" Scott, Domination and the Art of Resistance.
1
' Hellheck , Revo lution on My Mind.
'' On thi s issue. sec Kotk itL Magn eti c Mountain .
'" Th eodi cy has religious roots. hut as Max Weber noted , it can also be any
general theo ry th at explains or gives meaning to suffering: Weber, Economy and
Society (Berke ley: Unive rsity of California Press. 1978), especia ll y pp . .51 8-5 26.
,- E. P. Thompson . «The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the
Eighteenth Ce ntury ,» Past and Present vol. .50 ( 1971), pp. 76- 136.
" I do not claim these dichotomi es emerged solely because of or during th e
war: some certainly ex isted beforehand. For example , the dichotomy «justice/
eq uality-favo ritism/ patronage » cun be found in complaints during the 1930s, and
eve n in '.\'EP (e.g workers ' complaints about ~ e pmcn ) .
"J Emile Durkheim clai med that one of religion 's cruc ia l functi o ns was the
creation of sacred-profane dichotomies, which in turn structured action , identity ,
and the like. Durkheim , The Elementary forms of Religious Life (~cw York :
Free Press, 1965) .
4
° Cf. Lozungi k nase leniil.J osvobozhdennykh raion ov leningradskoi oblasti
(Leningrad: Otdelenic voenizdata NKO pri Leningradskom fronte, 1944); TsGAIPD
f. 25 , op. 10, d. 260, I. 6; f. 25, op 10, d. 334, l. 84, 119.
41
TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11 , d. 46 , l. 7.
4
' TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. I I, d. 35, I. 3.
41
GMMOBL RDf , Akt 76-07 , vol. I, I. I. (Kobyzeva's diary had just arrived in
the Muse um at the end of June 2007 as I was working there. As such, it had not
yet been assigned an op is' or dclo number, and the pages were not numerated is
listy. Thu-. . I cite it hy «akt» of act of acceptance into the Museum's arc hives, and
I assigned eac h si ngl e ph ysical page a list [I] number. Th ere were three not ebooks,
which ! labe l «volume » or «vol. »)
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TsGAlPD f. 4000. op. 11 , d. 46, I. 2.
' ' TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 18. d. 333. I. 118, 119.
4
h TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11, d. 46. I. 3. 4. 8. Kozlovskii. later noted how Leningrad
had become «a real military camp» (I. 6).
4
' TsGAI PD f. 4000, op. 11, d. 46, I. 6.
•> CiMMOBL RDr. /\kt 76-07, vol. l , I. 12. She also noted how the initial
evacuations of children were poorly planned: GMMOBL RDF , Akt 76-07, vol. l, l.
14. «The idea [evacuating children] was good. but as usual the implementation was
the opposite. » Even the more pro-Soviet and pro-Party Aleksei K01:lovskii
(clearly pro-Soviet and pro- Party) had to admit the evacuation of children was
problematic , not least because of varied or even bizarre destinations. TsCIAIPD f.
4000, op. 11 . d. 46, I. 5.
49
E.g. GMMOBL RDF, Akt 76-07, vol. I. I. 13, 14. «Nobody knew how to come
forward better, what to do. How gives advice? No one 1» (I. IJ).
0
' GMMOBL RDf. /\kt 76-07, vol. I. l. 13.
1
'
CiMMOl3L RDF. Akt 76-07. vol. I. I. On some problems with evacuation (of
people. machine1y. etc.) , see TsG/\ f. 7384, op. 3, d. 50. Evaluations of agitprop work,
carried out within agitprop departments. make it see m as if agitprop workers
were doing a wonderful job organizing evacuations.
·'" TsG/\IPD f. 4000. op. 11. d. 35, I. 15: Zelcnskaia mentions signals flairs going
up around the Sevkabel enterprise during one bombing raid. Adamovich and
Granin (Biokadnaia kniga. p. 331 n.l) claim that there was no evidence for these
!lairs.
'' TsG/\IPD f. 4000, op. 11. d. 44, I. 38. 106. In November 1941. Kcdrov was
surprised that Leningraders sti ll went about their business during air raid sirens
and bombings - even the po li ce gave up cajolin g them into bomb she lters
;., E.g. TsGATPD f. 4000. op. 11. d. 35.1. 93: TsGA IPD f. 4000, op. 11. d. 44, I. 88.
;< TsG/\IPD f. 4000, op. 11. d. 44, I. 21. 28. 31.
'" This was a sore point for some diarist s who complained of the AngloAmerican footdragging in setting up a second front. While logistics of the second
front were daunting - especially as the Western Allies did not follow Stalin 's
logic of incITTcicntly using resources, including people , wi ll y-nilly -- Leningradcrs
in the grip of the Blockade should obv iously be forgiven for impatience . Cf.
CMMOBL RDF, Akt 76-07, vol. 2, I. 24; TsCiAIPD f. 4000, op. l I, d. 44.1. 77. 85. 89.
95 , and 96. among others.
" In post -war Leningrad , some inhabitants complained about food rations.
the decline in their purchasing power as a result of Stalin's monetary reform . and
the possibility of a new war, this time with former allies. C1iven that people made
similar complaints before the end of war - whi ch the NKVD duly collected
and reported (but not always as «an ti- Soviet ») -- is significant. Cf. TsCiA f. 7384,
op. 36 , d. 129. 5' G reenfeld , Nationalism. chapter 3.
59
Cf. Kotkin , Magnetic Mountain. espec iall y chapters 4 and 5.
60
One interesting issue that addresses this is theft. especially of food and
ration cards. Theft is, in a sense, an expression of individualism: I steal from you
for mv own survival. even if it hurts vours . Theft of food and ration cards was
probl~matic in the Blockade ; diarist s ~ften note how people would steal food in
a bread line, and how others in that line would promptly turn on the thief and
beat him or her senseless (even if the thief were a sta rving youth).
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E.g. GMMOBL RDF. op. Ir, d. 37. tt3.

273

"' I also se nse here gendered narrative , where wome n were fickle and could
not be trusted. Samarin ends one rant about hi s wife 's lack of truthworthiness
wi th the co mment, «Such are women .» In another entry , he mentioned th e
death of a comrade from work and complains about his wife, who did not see m
shaken by the death a nd who did little to help him survive. GMMOBL RDf.
op. l L d. 338. l. 73 , 89.
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strained both their nerves. Eventually they split. and he complained bitterl y about
being alone.
M On e extreme expression of this was when parents wou ld sac rifice their
chi ld ren for their own individual surv ival. Some diarists did note hearing of such
examples: however. the y see med rare.
6 ; TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11 , d. 35, I. 19.
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TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. l l. d. 35. l. 24, 6 1. Sec also I. 41 , 46 , 47.
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' TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11 , d. 35 , I. 96 .
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2
' This is an important theme that runs throughout nearly every diary r have
read so far. Those who survived consistently wrote , especially in 1941 - 42 , th at
they wanted to live, despite the difficulties of Blockade life . In some cases it
almost see ms that survival wou ld be the ultimate act of revenge against th e
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Steve Maddox

The Memory of the Blockade
and its Function in the Restoration
of Leningrad, 1944-1949
In postwar Leningrad, the memory of the blockade informed all
aspects of life. Leningrad's party and soviet leadership, ordinary
citizens, and all else who suffered the horrors of the nine-hundred
days felt the desire to commemorate the blockade and preserve the
memory of it. For the people who lived through the blockade - the
hlokadniki - it became the cornerstone of their identity.' No longer
would they understand their surroundings through prewar lenses.
Rather, the blockade became the formative experience through
which the world was viewed. 2 The magnitude of the siege, the mark
it left on the city and its residents, as we11 as its significance in the
immediate postwar period, necessitated its commemoration and
memorialization.
Plans to commemorate the blockade of Leningrad began during
the event itself.3 Leningraders went to great lengths to preserve the
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